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NO MORE MESSING AROUND: SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO STATE LAWS
PROHIBITING FORNICATION
Traci Shallbetter Stratton
Abstract: Anglo-American law has historically prohibited fornication, and through the
1960s fornication remained illegal in all but ten states. Few questioned the validity of laws
proscribing various forms of private, adult, consensual sexual behavior until the early 1970s.
Aside from legislative repeal, substantive due process has been the primary weapon in the
fight against state sex laws. Although the U.S. Supreme Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence, particularly in the area of personal privacy, has brought the constitutionality of
fornication statutes into question, it has not definitively resolved the matter. This Comment
argues that laws prohibiting fornication do not violate substantive due process. It reasons that
fornication laws need only withstand rational basis review because history does not support a
right to fornicate, and the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence does not encompass such a
right. This Comment contends, alternatively, that even if the Court were to find a fundamental
right to engage in sex, fornication laws would withstand strict scrutiny. Finally, the Comment
concludes that states should pass, but not necessarily enforce, fornication laws.
Laws prohibiting fornication' remain on the books in at least thirteen
states and the District of Columbia.2 Until the 1970s, few questioned the
validity of laws prohibiting various forms of private, adult, consensual
sexual behavior.3 Today, however, these laws, at the threshold of
1. Although statutory definitions vary slightly, fornication is the act of sexual intercourse between
persons who are not married to each other. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Legal Regulation of Sexual
Conduct 46 (1961).
2. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1002 (1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-18 (1996); Idaho Code § 18-6603
(1997); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-8 (West 1993); Mass. Ann. Laws. ch. 272, § 18 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.34 (West 1987); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-1 (1994); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-184 (1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20.08 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-60 (Law
Co-op. 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-104 (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1996); W. Va.
Code § 61-8-3 (1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 944.15 (West 1996); see Richard A. Posner & Katharine B.
Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws 98-102 (1996) (listing enactment dates of state fornication
statutes, ranging from as early as 1692 (Massachusetts) to as late as 1973 (North Dakota)).
Additionally, at least four states that do not expressly prohibit fornication have outlawed
cohabitation. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1409 (West 1989); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 798.02 (West
1992); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.335 (West 1991); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-10-2 (Michie 1994). It
is also a federal offense to knowingly transport or persuade an individual to travel in interstate or
foreign commerce with the intent that such individual enuage in criminal sexual activity. 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2421-2422 (West Supp. 1998). See generally Posner & Silbaugh, supra (providing
state-by-state review of fornication and cohabitation laws, including enactment dates).
3. Richard Green, Fornication: Common Law Legacy and American Sexual Privacy, 17 Anglo-
Am. L. Rev. 226,228 (1988).
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attempts to regulate sexual conduct,4 are the subject of much dispute.
Courts nationwide are divided over whether fornication is a fundamental
right, and whether the right to privacy protects private, consensual sex
between unmarried heterosexual adults.' Some lower courts have upheld
laws prohibiting fornication or deviant consensual sex between
unmarried heterosexual adults as valid exercises of the police power;
6
others have struck down these statutes as violations of the right to
privacy.7 The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the right to personal
privacy includes an individual's liberty to make choices regarding
contraception and abortion;8 nevertheless, it has upheld statutes
prohibiting sodomy as applied to consenting homosexual adults.9 The
Court has emphasized that its substantive due process opinions,
particularly in the area of privacy, have not decided the constitutionality
of statutes prohibiting fornication."
This Comment argues that fornication statutes do not violate an
individual's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. Part
I briefly traces the history of fornication laws in the United States. Part II
presents the framework for evaluating a substantive due process
challenge. Part III summarizes the Supreme Court's privacy
jurisprudence" and notes that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor lower
courts have resolved whether fornication proscriptions are constitutional.
Part IV argues that no fundamental right to fornicate exists; thus,
fornication statutes are subject to rational basis review. It notes that
fornication statutes do not violate substantive due process because states
have numerous rational bases for proscribing fornication. Part V
contends that, even if the Court were to find that statutes prohibiting
fornication warrant strict scrutiny, the statutes would withstand it. Part
4. Id. at 237. If fornication laws withstand substantive due process challenges, legislation related
to less conventional private consensual sexual conduct, such as adultery and homosexuality, has a
strong chance of being upheld. See id. at 238.
5. See, e.g., Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, 181-82 (Md. 1990) (noting significant division
among courts addressing constitutionality of punishing consensual sex between heterosexual adults).
6. See infra note 102.
7. See infra notes 99-100.
8. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
9. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17.
11. The concept of constitutional privacy has embraced at least two different kinds of interests:
the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the individual's interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977). This Comment focuses on the latter.
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VI argues that unenforced fornication statutes are constitutional, avoid
undesirable outcomes, and serve as valuable rhetorical devices. This
Comment concludes that states have legitimate reasons to pass and
publicize, but not necessarily enforce, fornication laws.
I. THE HISTORY OF FORNICATION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
Anglo-American tradition, grounded in Hebraic law and early English
law, has long prohibited "deviant" and nonmarital sexual behavior. 2 In
England, fornication was generally an offense only addressed in the
ecclesiastical courts, but common-law courts occasionally exercised
jurisdiction. 3 The American colonies, which lacked ecclesiastical courts,
consistently regulated fornication by statute. 4 Intent on enforcing Puritan
morality, the colonists enacted statutes making fornication an offense
punishable by fine, marriage, or corporal punishment. 5 Fornication laws
were actively enforced throughout the colonial period.' Historically,
fornication was illegal in all jurisdictions of the United States.1" In the
eighteenth century and thereafter, states less frequently prosecuted, and
courts less frequently enforced, fornication laws.'
Attitudes toward sexuality underwent significant liberalization during
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 9 and fornication laws
gradually lapsed into desuetude.2 ° Yet, as late as 1965 all but ten states
12. Ex. 20:14 (forbidding adultery); Lev. 18:6-29; 20:10-21 (describing unlawful sexual
relations); Deut. 23: 18 (prohibiting prostitution); Mt. 15:19 (noting that sexual immorality makes a
person unclean); I Cor. 6:13-18 (explaining that sexual sins are harmful to body); 1 Thess. 4:3
(warning community to avoid sexual immorality); 4 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Law in England 64-65 (William Draper Lewis, ed. 1898).
13. Morris Ploscowe, Sex and the Law 142 (1951).
14. Id. at 143-45.
15. Id. at 143. Legislation differed colony by colony concerning the way fornication was defined
and punished. See id. at 143-45; John D'Emilio & Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History
of Sexuality in America 22 (1988) (describing different punishments); Robert Veit Sherwin, Sex and
the Statutory Law pt. 1, at 19 (1949) (noting different definitions).
16. Geoffrey May, Social Control of Sex Expression 192 (1930).
17. Donal E. J. MacNamara & Edward Sagarin, Sex, Crime, and the Law 186 (1977).
18. D'Emilio & Freedman, supra note 15, at 49.
19. See id. at 138-39, 188-201,223, 233-35.
20. MacNamara & Sagarin, supra note 17, at 187. But see Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill.
1979) (using fornication statute to divest mother of child custody); Commonwealth v. Sager, 419
A.2d 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (reversing defendant's fornication conviction because guilty plea
was not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently); Quentin Hardy, Idaho County Tests a New
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prohibited fornication.2' Presently, thirteen states and the District of
Columbia prohibit fornication, and at least four additional states outlaw
cohabitation.'
II. FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no State shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In
adjudicating the constitutionality of statutes under this clause, a major
distinction exists between legislation that burdens fundamental rights and
legislation that does not.24 If no fundamental right is involved, the Court
evaluates a law challenged on substantive due process grounds under the
rational basis test.25 When legislation infringes upon a fundamental right,
the Court applies strict scrutiny, requiring that the statute be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
26
A. When is a Right Fundamental?
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed two approaches to discerning
when a right not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution is
fundamental, and thus worthy of heightened scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The first appeals to "our
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." '27 Under this approach,
Way to Curb Teen Sex: Prosecute, Wall St. J., July 8, 1996, at Al (discussing Emmet County's
prosecution of teen fornicators); see also Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal
Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1660, 1662 (1991) (asserting that
fornication laws are most commonly enforced against suspected prostitutes, rapists, and other
criminals).
21. Sexual Behavior and the Law 10 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965).
22. See supra note 2.
23. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305, 311 (1993) (noting that because narrowly tailored
requirement only applies when fundamental right is involved, state need only demonstrate
"reasonable fit" between government purpose and means).
25. Id.
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
27. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258, 2262 (1997). Criticism of the historical method
abounds. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 98-109
(1991) (discussing manipulability of tradition and its potential to curtail Court's role in protecting
individual liberties); William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 737, 779-80
(1995) (suggesting traditions are often incompatible with principles embedded in liberal
constitutionalism); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 671, 735-36 (1973) (criticizing tradition as standard for judging fundamentality because it
Vol. 73:767, 1998
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due process protects those liberties so "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,"'28 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 9
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."3
Under the Court's second method, a right may be deemed
fundamental even if it lacks an historical pedigree. The Court uses a
common law process to define the scope of a general fundamental right,
such as the right to privacy, which it has inferred from particular
constitutional guarantees and principles.3 If a broad, inferred liberty
encompasses the newly claimed right, the Court will subject statutes
infringing on the right to strict scrutiny.32 The level of generality at
which the Court defines the right at issue, and the fundamental rights it
has previously protected, often determines whether precedent will
encompass the newly claimed right, elevating it to the status of
fundamental.33
relies on traditional majority view without allowing for changing mores). But see Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 Cim. L. Rev. 849, 863-64 (1989) (acknowledging that danger of
judges mistaking their own predilections for law plagues originalism, but asserting that it is to lesser
extent than nonoriginalism).
28. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
29. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
30. Id. at 326; see, e.g., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262-75; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191-94 (1986).
31. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (locating privacy right in Fourteenth Amendment Due Process liberty
guarantee and construing it to protect woman's right to choose abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (locating right to privacy within penumbras of First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments and construing it to protect marital relations).
32. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155;
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
33. Tribe & Don; supra note 27, at 73-80; see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 1427-28 (2d. ed. 1988) (arguing that Bowers Court defined liberty claim at wrong level of
generality).
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B. Infringements upon Non-fundamental Rights Receive Rational
Basis Review
When no fundamental right is involved, the Court generally evaluates
laws challenged on substantive due process grounds according to the
rational basis test.34 Under this standard, the Court defers heavily to
legislative judgment.35 Assuming no other specific constitutional
limitation on government power is implicated, an offending statute will
pass constitutional muster if the legislation has some minimally
plausible, even if unproven and unlikely, relation to a permissible
legislative purpose. 6 Most aspects of an individual's life are not
"fundamental," and statutes regulating them bear a presumption of
validity.
37
C. Statutory Infringements upon Fundamental Rights Receive Strict
Scrutiny Review
Statutes limiting fundamental rights must be justified by a compelling
state interest and narrowly drawn to further the interest." The Court has
34. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. Occasionally, however, the Court uses a "continuum" approach in
substantive due process cases. Rather than defer to the legislature when no fundamental right is
involved, the Court evaluates the constitutionality of statutes by balancing the nature of the
governmental interest in regulating the conduct against the burden on, and the importance ot the
right. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 499 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that mentally ill prisoner has
significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs, but that state
interest in prison safety was sufficient to override it); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990) (finding significant liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, but
state's interest in preservation of human life and choice in matters of life and death justifies
restrictions).
35. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955).
36. Id.
37. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,319 (1993).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). The strength of the compelling interest required and
the extent of the personal right may vary according to the nature of the right involved and the burden
of government action on the claimant. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(observing that state may impose reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
decisions to marry), with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883 (1992) (prohibiting
government from unduly burdening woman's right to abortion, yet upholding mandatory waiting
periods and informed consent), Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting
choices of family living arrangements, but refusing to extend right to unrelated individuals and not
questioning adoption of neutral land-use regulations limiting dwelling size), and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that state cannot prevent parents from educating their children
Fornication Laws
provided little guidance on what constitutes a "compelling interest,"39 but
it has indicated that a statute can satisfy the compelling interest test even
when it infringes on a privacy right.' In some instances, the Court has
suggested that nothing short of war is compelling;4" in others, it has
implied that a uniform day of rest42 or limiting the actuality and
appearance of corruption is sufficient.43 The Court has also hinted that
"extirpating the traffic in illegal drugs," "preventing the community from
being disrupted by violent disorders," and "forestalling assassination
attempts on the President" are compelling interests.'
The Court has been equally imprecise in defining how "narrowly
tailored" a statute must be to withstand strict scrutiny. Often the Court
finds that a statute is not narrowly tailored when a less offensive
alternative would serve the state's purpose.45 Yet, the Court does not
always require the state to show that its chosen alternative is the least
restrictive if a close fit exists between the state's actual interest and the
means by which it achieves that interest.46
in private school, yet suggesting that state may dictate minimum requirements for education
received).
39. Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An
Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1988, at 79,
93-95.
40. The Court has occasionally permitted state interests to infringe upon a fundamental right of
privacy. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (finding that informed consent requirements, 24-hour waiting
period, parental consent provision, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements do not impose
undue burden on woman's right to abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
(upholding requirement of pathology report for each abortion performed and requirement of minor's
security of consent from parent or juvenile court); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (finding compelling state
interest in regulating abortion at end of first trimester for preservation of maternal health and
compelling state interest in protecting fetal life after viability).
41. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding wartime racial classification
against equal protection challenge). It is unclear whether "compelling" has the same meaning in the
substantive due process context as it does in the equal protection context.
42. Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398,409 (1963).
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
44. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,700-01 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhal, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (finding that state has equally
effective means for exacting compliance with child support obligations that do not impinge upon
right to marry).
46. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885-87 (1992) (upholding 24-hour
waiting period between provision of information and performance of abortion as not constituting
"undue burden" when, arguably, provision that merely required information about abortion and
alternatives be given to woman would have been equally effective and less restrictive); Buckley, 424
U.S. at 60-84 (upholding disclosure requirement for campaign contributions against First
Washington Law Review Vol. 73:767, 1998
111. COURTS HAVE NOT RESOLVED WHETHER FORNICATION
LAWS VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Not Addressed Whether Fornication
Laws Violate Substantive Due Process Guarantees
1. The Supreme Court Has Avoided Interfering with State Regulation
ofFornication
The U.S. Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to attack the
broad array of American laws that forbid private consensual sexual
conduct, but it has consistently denied certiorari to these cases.47
Although the Court has upheld laws prohibiting sodomy as applied to
homosexuals, it has not considered their constitutionality as applied to
consenting heterosexual adults.4" Its opinions have ceded to state
legislatures "a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent
fornication."'49 The Court has extended the fundamental right to privacy
to individuals' decisions relating to marriage,"°  procreation,"1
contraception,52 and child bearing;53 but, it has insisted that its decisions
in the privacy cases have "not definitively answered the difficult question
Amendment challenge when use of higher threshold for required disclosure would have been less
onerous alternative for preventing corruption).
47. See, e.g., Henry v. City of Sherman, 117 S. Ct 1098 (1997), denying cert. to 928 S.W.2d 464
(Tex. 1996) (discharge of police officer for adultery); Oklahoma v. Post, 479 U.S. 890, denying cert.
to Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (right to select consensual adult sex partners
and engage in abnormal sex acts, whether married or unmarried); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free
Library, 439 U.S. 1052, denying cert. to 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978) (discharge of two public
employees for adultery and cohabitation); see also Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the
Burger Court, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1980, at 86 (noting that Court has avoided number
of chances to overturn American laws forbidding sexual expression).
48. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986).
49. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449 (1972); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (emphasizing
that claim that privacy line of cases "stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that
constitutionality of Connecticut's laws against adultery and fornication is "beyond doubt' and that
"Court's holding today.., in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual
promiscuity or misconduct').
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
51. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541-42 (1942).
52. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'I, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54.
53. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults."'54
2. The Abortion and Contraception Cases Do Not Establish a
Generalized Right to Engage in Sex
Supreme Court opinions extending the right to privacy to individuals'
decisions about abortion and contraception may provide impetus for
challenging fornication laws, but none of these opinions indicate that the
right to privacy protects fornication. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court held that a law forbidding the use of contraceptives
unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy." The
majority inferred a general right to privacy from the "penumbras" of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 6 Concurring Justices
located the privacy right in the Ninth Amendment, finding it to emanate
from the 'traditions and [collective] consciences of our people"'57 and
be "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 58 The Court, at least
temporarily, limited the reach of Griswold by firmly grounding the
newly recognized privacy right in the sanctity of marriage.59
Years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts statute criminalizing the dispensation of contraceptives to
unmarried persons.' A plurality decided that the statute's differential
treatment of married and unmarried persons was arbitrary, and hence a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.6 The Court did not question the
legitimacy of the state's goal of preventing fornication;62 rather, it found
that deterrence of nonmarital sexual intercourse could not reasonably be
54. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89 n.5.
55. 381 U.S. 479,486(1965).
56. Id. at 484-85.
57. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
58. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
59. Id. at 486; see also id. at 495-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 502, 505-07 (White, .,
concurring).
60. 405 U.S. 438,440(1972).
61. Id. at454-55.
62. The Eisenstadt plurality conceded "that the State could, consistently with the Equal Protection
Clause, regard the problems of extramarital and premarital sexual relations as '[e]vils... of different
dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies."' 405 U.S. at 448 (quoting Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955)).
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regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law.63 The Court offered
the following expansive dictum, upon which some courts have relied to
support the idea that Griswold's privacy right, to the extent that it
protects sexual relations, is not limited to the marital relationship: 
6
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.65
The Court, however, underscored that it was not deciding whether
statutes forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons infringed upon the right to privacy.'
Carey v. Population Services International clarified the relationship
between sexual privacy and contraception.67  The Court held
unconstitutional a New York statute that forbid the sale of contraceptives
to married or unmarried persons under age sixteen, and prohibited
distribution to people over sixteen by anyone other than a licensed
pharmacist.68 Carey characterized the combined reasoning of Griswold
and Eisenstadt as protecting 'the right of the individual.., to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into.., the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."' 69 The Court did not recognize an independent
fundamental right of access to contraceptives, but held such access
essential to preserve the constitutional right to privacy that protects
decisions concerning childbearing.7" Hence, the Court subjected the
regulation of contraception to strict scrutiny.7' Although some may use
the Carey decision as a springboard for challenging fornication statutes,
the Carey Court did not object to the state's policy of reducing the
63. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448-50.
64. See, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (invalidating criminal sodomy
statute as applied to consenting unmarried adults); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339-40 (NJ.
1977) (striking down fornication statute); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41 (N.Y. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (striking down law criminalizing consensual sodomy between
unmarried adults).
65. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
66. Id. at 453-55.
67. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
68. Id. at 681-82.
69. Id. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
70. Id. at 688.
71. Id. at 688-89.
Vol. 73:767, 1998
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incidence of premarital sex. It merely found no evidence that
withholding the availability of contraceptives accomplished that goal.72
In Roe v. Wade, the Court expanded the right to privacy by holding
that the privacy right encompassed a woman's right to choose whether to
have an abortion. 3 The Court articulated, however, that the right to
privacy does not mean that "one has an unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases."74 The Court required that prior to the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation be left to the
judgment of the woman and her physician.75 It determined that the state
had a compelling interest in limited regulation of abortion after the end
of the first trimester, and a compelling interest in regulating or even
proscribing abortion after fetal viability.76
The joint opinion crafted by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey spoke little of a right to privacy, but did
contain seemingly limitless dicta embracing an individual's right to make
decisions about intimate and personal matters.77 The plurality reaffirmed
the "central holding" of Roe, but abandoned its "rigid trimester
framework" and adopted an "undue burden" test for evaluating abortion
restrictions.7" It upheld several of the Pennsylvania statute's restrictions
on abortion under this standard,79 suggesting that the privacy protection
was not impenetrable.
3. Additional Decisions Indicate the Court's Reluctance to Expand the
Scope of Privacy
Although the Court has linked privacy to intimate places such as the
marital bedroom80 and the home,8 it has expressed unwillingness to
72. Id. at 695.
73. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
74. Id. at 154.
75. Id. at 164-65.
76. Id.
77. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy
[and] right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life [are] central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
78. Id. at 878-79.
79. Id. at 880, 887, 898-99, 901.
80. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
81. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down Georgia anti-pornography statute
to extent that it criminalized possession of pornography by adult in home).
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expand the category of fundamental rights in any way that would
necessitate the invalidation of statutes prohibiting sexual crimes
committed in the home. 2 In Stanley v. Georgia, a pornography case, the
Court acknowledged the claimant's "right to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. 8 3 However, it based its
decision almost entirely upon the First Amendment freedom of speech
and the press,' 4 and emphasized that illegal conduct is not protected just
because it occurs in the home.85
The Court has also refused to deem conduct beyond state regulation
merely because it involves consenting adults.86 In Bowers v. Hardwick,
the Court upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy statute as applied to consenting
adult homosexuals in the privacy of the home. Noting that proscriptions
against homosexual sodomy have "ancient roots, ' 8 the Court concluded
that homosexual sodomy was not a fundamental liberty.89 It also detected
no relationship between homosexual activity and previously protected
privacy rights concerning the family, marriage, and procreation." The
Court rejected the notion that "any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription."9 Since Bowers, no court has specifically ruled on the
constitutionality of fornication statutes as applied to adults;92 thus, the
82. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
83. 394 U.S. at 565.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 568 n. 11.
86. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973) (upholding state prohibition of
commercial exhibition of obscene films to consenting adults).
87. 478 U.S. 186.
88. Id. at 192.
89. Id. at 192-93.
90. Id. at 191.
91. Id.
92. In 1988, the Maryland appellate court upheld a statute prohibiting certain sexual acts between
consenting, unmarried, heterosexual adults. Schochet v. State, 541 A.2d 183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988). However, the Maryland Supreme Court held that the statute criminalizing certain sexual acts
did not encompass consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in the privacy
of the home, and thus did not decide the issue. Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990). Courts
have relied on the Bowers Court's reasoning in declaring that other illicit adult sexual relationships
are not protected by the right to privacy. See, e.g., Roe H v. Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. 1569, 1574,
1577-83 (S.D. Fla.), a]f'd, 129 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 1997) (prostitution); Oliverson v. West Valley
City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1482-83 (D. Utah 1995) (adultery); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d
464,469-72 (Tex. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1098 (1997) (adultery).
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extent to which Bowers signifies the Court's approval of State regulation
of nonmarital sexual conduct has yet to be determined.
Recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held that a
right to assisted suicide is neither rooted in the nation's history or
traditions93 nor analogous to the specific freedoms protected in the Bill of
Rights or the Due Process Clause.94 The Court expressed its reluctance to
expand the concept of substantive due process9" and explained that Casey
did not mean that the Due Process Clause protects any and all important,
intimate, and personal decisions.96 The Court's reasoning in Glucksberg
casts doubt upon the recognition of a fundamental right to fornicate.
B. Lower Courts Disagree on Whether Fornication Laws Violate the
Right to Privacy
Lower courts are divided over the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
fornication and "deviant" heterosexual acts between unmarried
consenting adults.97 Most lower courts that have invalidated such statutes
have done so on the ground that they violate the individual's right to
privacy.9" Some courts have also given special consideration to the right
of spatial privacy99 or held that statutes prohibiting certain heterosexual
conduct between unmarried persons violate constitutional guarantees of
equal protection."'
Conversely, numerous lower courts have upheld statutes prohibiting
fornication and deviant sexual acts between consenting heterosexual
93. 117 S. Ct. 2258,2271(1997).
94. Id. at 2267-7 1.
95. Id. at 2267-68.
96. Id. at 2271.
97. Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, 181-82 (Md. 1990) (noting significant division among
courts addressing constitutionality of punishing consensual sex between heterosexual adults); see
also infra notes 99-102.
98. See, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d
333, 340-41 (N.J. 1977); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 (N.Y. 1980); Post v. State, 715
P.2d 1105, 1109 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
99. See, e.g., Post, 715 P.2d at 1109 (construing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 555 (1969), to
extend right to privacy to matters of sexual gratification occurring in home).
100. See, e.g., Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 676-77 (Fla. 1979); Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
415 A.2d 47, 51 (Pa. 1980). Potential equal protection challenges are beyond the scope of this
Comment
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adults in private.1°' In these cases, courts have found that none of the
U.S. Supreme Court's holdings imply that the right to privacy protects
private sexual activity between unmarried consenting adults.'0 2 They
have reasoned that imposing sanctions on behavior deemed harmful or
offensive by the state represents a valid exercise of the police power. 3
IV. FORNICATION STATUTES RECEIVE AND WITHSTAND
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
places the constitutionality of fornication statutes in serious doubt." ' Yet,
neither the Court's historical nor common law approach supports the
existence of a fundamental right to fornicate. Consequently, the Court
must review fornication statutes under the rational basis test. Fornication
statutes are rationally related to state interests; thus, they do not violate
substantive due process.
A. History and Tradition Do Not Support a Fundamental Right to
Engage in Consensual, Nonmarital, Heterosexual Sex
Fornication was a punishable offense in the United States at the time
of colonization,I0" and remained illegal in forty states 06 until the early
1970s'07 Such consistent prohibition of consensual heterosexual conduct
among unmarried adults0 8 indicates that a right to fornicate is not one of
101. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz. 1976); State v. Elliott, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.M.
1976); State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct App. 1979); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (RI. 1980).
Three cases, now overruled by State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.L 1977), provide additional
analysis of why fornication statutes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Clark, 275
A.2d 137 (N.J. 1971); State v. Lutz, 272 A.2d 753 (NJ. 1971); State v. Barr, 265 A.2d 817, 819
(N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1970).
102. See, e.g., Bateman, 547 P.2d at 9-10; Elliott, 551 P.2d at 1353; Poe, 252 S.E.2d at 844-45;
Santos, 413 A.2d at 66-68.
103. See, e.g., Bateman, 547 P.2d at 10; Poe, 252 S.E.2d at 845; see also Barr, 265 A.2d at 819,
overruled by Saunders, 381 A.2d 333.
104. See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 20, at 1663; Note, Fornication, Cohabitation,
and the Constitution, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 252,257 (1978).
105. May, supra note 16, at 205; see also supra Part I; Model Penal Code § 213.6, note on
adultery and fornication, at 430 (1980) (discussing historical prohibition of fornication).
106. Sexual Behavior and the Law, supra note 21, at 10.
107. Green, supra note 3, at 228.
108. See supra Part L
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those rights so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' 9 that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.""'
Lack of enforcement". and widespread disobedience of the law"2 do
not alter this conclusion. Nonenforcement and violation of the law may
suggest states' tacit acceptance of the difficulty in enforcing and obeying
fornication laws, but such relaxed attitudes do not elevate non-marital
sex to constitutionally protected status."' Even if legislative
decriminalization were to occur nationwide,"4 nonmarital sex would
only be a permitted activity, not a protected one." 5 The Constitution does
not protect as fundamental what, until recently, virtually all states have
prohibited since the founding of the Republic. 6 Fornication is hardly
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
fundamental."" 7
B. The Fundamental Right to Privacy Does Not Encompass a Right
to Fornicate
1. A Fundamental Right to Make Personal Decisions Does Not Imply
a Fundamental Right to Engage in Fornication
If there is a constitutional right to make decisions relating to
contraception and abortion, must there be a constitutional right to use
109. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
110. Id. at 326.
111. See Note, Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations as Criminal Offenses, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev.
162, 170-73 (1949-50); see also Model Penal Code, supra note 106, at 434. Cf. Hillary Greene,
Note, Undead Lmvs: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal
Litigation, 16 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 169 (1997) (noting that fornication laws are rarely directly
enforced and arguing that secondary application of disused laws is unjust). But see, e.g., State v.
Spanbauer, 322 N.W.2d 511 (Wis. 1982) (upholding conviction of fornication); Hardy, supra note
20, at Al (discussing Emmet County's prosecution of teen fornicators under Idaho's 1920
fornication law).
112. See MacNarnara & Sagarin, supra note 17, at 187 (observing that fornication laws have
withered away under impact of mass open defiance); Note, supra note 112, at 163, 167 (giving
percentage of white males whose acts would subject them to prosecution under sex statutes).
113. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy:
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 567 (1983).
114. See Model Penal Code, supra note 106, at 436-39 (advocating decriminalization).
115. Hafen, supra note 114, at 567.
116. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
117. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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contraceptives while engaging in sexual intercourse, whether married or
single?"' Some scholars have asserted that the abortion and
contraception cases do not concern the right of access to contraception or
abortion, but rather "the right to liberate sex from conception-to engage
in and perhaps even enjoy sex for its own sake."".9 However, a
generalized right to sexual gratification, whether marital or non-marital,
does not logically flow from the premises of the contraception and
abortion cases.
a. The Court's Opinions Protect Childbearing, Not Sex
In its abortion and contraception cases, the Court protected the
freedom to decide whether to have children, not the freedom to engage in
nonmarital sex.2 The right to prevent or terminate a pregnancy stems, at
least in part, from the Court's unwillingness to force the creation of an
unwanted parent-child relationship."' As the Court explained:
'It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that [the state] has
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [or the
physical and psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment
for fornication.' We remain reluctant to attribute any such 'scheme
of values' to the state. 2
2
This suggests that the Constitution protects a woman's rights to
contraception and abortion not because it sanctions sexual intercourse in
all contexts, but because restrictions on such rights intrude unfairly upon
118. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D. Va. 1985) (remarking, "[n]ecessarily
implicit in the right to make decisions regarding childbearing is the right to engage in sexual
intercourse"), rev'don other grounds, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986).
119. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. Fain. L.
45, at 84 (1991/1992) (referring to analysis of Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law,
supra note 33, at 1423); see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Griswold for "serious doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an
interest in regulating any sexual act between consenting adults"); Note, supra note 27, at 733.
120. James Rizzo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordham L. Rev 553,
575-76(1976).
121. Hafen, supra note 114, at 542. Cf Grey, supra note 48, at 88 (suggesting that such decisions
were based on concerns that undesired pregnancies, single-parent families, irresponsible youthful
parents, and abandoned or neglected children threaten social and family stability).
122. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
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a woman by increasing the likelihood that she will have to bear and raise
a child."
The Court's opinions in the abortion and contraception cases evince
its preoccupation with the "unique" liberty involved in the decision of
whether to bear a child: 4 the right to contraception or abortion cannot be
proscribed because to do so would impose anxiety, suffering, and mental,
physical, and financial constraints on a woman."u Limiting one's choice
to engage in sexual relations by requiring an individual to enjoy sex only
within a marital relationship does not burden the individual in a
comparable manner. The physical, emotional, and financial burdens of
laws restricting contraception and abortion are of a much greater
magnitude than those associated with prohibiting fornication. It does not
follow, therefore, that the Court's disapproval of fornication requires its
disapproval of abortion and contraception.126
In its abortion and contraception decisions, the Court did not doubt the
legitimacy of a state's use of the criminal law to directly prohibit
immoral sexual activity; rather, it disapproved of the government's effort
to stop sexual activity through regulation of procreation. The Court has
continually distinguished the right to access contraceptives and abortion
from the right to sexual freedom.'27 Had Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey,
Roe, and Casey merely concerned sex, the Court could not have brushed
them aside so easily in Bowers.'28 Childbearing and sexual relations are
simply two different matters. 29
123. Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 295-96.
124. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
125. Id.
126. Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 296; see also Grey, supra note 48, at 88 (asserting that
contraception and abortion cases are simply family planning cases based on practical
considerations).
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986); Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5; see also
Grey, supra note 48, at 88 n.31.
128. Richard Posner, Sex and Reason 342 (1992).
129. Hafen, supra note 114, at 531.
Washington Law Review
b. The Court's Privacy Jurisprudence Has Limited the Scope of
Protected Personal Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court has severely restricted the scope of personal
decisions protected by the right to privacy. 30 None of the Court's
privacy cases indicate that protecting an individual's right to make
personal decisions relating to "marriage, procreation, [and]
contraception" necessitates protecting decisions concerning private
consensual adult sexual relations. 3' In'fact, in Carey and Roe, the Court
carefully noted that it has not extended protection to the decision to
fornicate.
32
The Casey decision described the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty
provision as protecting personal decisions involving intimate choices
"central to personal dignity and autonomy"' 33 that "originate within the
zone of conscience and belief."' 34 The Court has subsequently severely
disabled the seemingly limitless scope of this language, 35 explicitly
stating in Glucksberg that reference to decisional autonomy in earlier
privacy opinions'3 6 in no way expanded the Court's privacy
jurisprudence. 137 The right to privacy does not encompass decisions
related to how and when to have sexual intercourse just because such
decisions involve intimate, personal choices and may be central to
personal dignity and autonomy. 3 As the Court noted:
That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
130. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271 (1997). But see Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 1423.
131. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 (citations omitted), 688 n.5, 694 n.17. But see supra note 99
(listing pre-Bowers opinions concluding that consenting adults possessed fundamental right to make
decision to engage in nonmarital sex).
132. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (noting that Court has not decided whether
Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating private consensual sexual adult conduct); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (rejecting broad right of individual autonomy allowing one to "do
with one's body as one pleases").
133. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
134. Id. at 852.
135. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2271 (1997).
136. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.




decisions are so protected... and Casey did not suggest
otherwise.'39
The decision to have sex outside of marriage is important and
personal; 4 however, decisions to engage in homosexual conduct and to
commit assisted suicide are equally essential to individual autonomy, yet
the Court has refused to protect them."'
The Court has declined to create an inherently limitless and
implausible right of individual autonomy in personal decisionmaking.142
Bestowing fundamental status on decisions related to intimate aspects of
an individual's life could potentially enable an individual to label any
decision an intimate one, thereby hindering the state's ability to regulate
his or her conduct. Even advocates of an expanded right to privacy that
would encompass nonmarital sexual activity recognize the necessity of
limiting its application, 43 acknowledging that "[a] concept in danger of
embracing everything is a concept in danger of conveying nothing."'"
c. Logic Denies That a Fundamental Right to Contraception and
Abortion Necessitates a Fundamental Right to Engage in
Nonmarital Sex
Finally, as a matter of logic, the privacy right's protection of personal
decisions relating to procreation, contraception, and childbearing 45 does
not require protection of nonmarital heterosexual intercourse. For
example, it may be unlawful for a car dealer to deny people without
drivers' licenses the right to purchase a car; yet, it does not logically
follow that these people must have a right to drive a car without a
license. Criminals possess constitutional rights even though they commit
crimes. An individual can have a right to wear a safety helmet when he
rides a bicycle, without having a right to ride a bicycle. 46 Homosexuals
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings L.. 957, 1003-09 (1979)
(discussing importance of sex to humans).
141. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270 (assisted suicide); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (homosexual sodomy).
142. See, eg., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
143. Note, supra note 27, at 673; Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 1304.
144. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 1304.
145. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
146. Grey, supra note 48, at 88 n.31.
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have a fundamental right to contraception,147 though they do not
necessarily have the right to use it in homosexual intercourse.'48 Hence,
fundamental rights of access to contraception and abortion do not
necessitate a fundamental right to sexual liberty. 49
2. Sexual Conduct Falls Within the Right to Privacy, ifat All, Only
When the Consenting Adults Are Married to Each Other
The Court's decisions in the line of privacy cases indicate that if a
fundamental right to sexual privacy exists, it exists only within the
marriage. 5 ' In Griswold, Justice Douglas spoke of "the notions to
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship"'' and marriage as
"intimate to the degree of being sacred."'52 Eisenstadt merely held that
unmarried individuals must have equal access to contraceptives (unless
the legislature has a rational basis for concluding otherwise), and not that
the right to privacy protects nonmarital, consensual, sexual intimacy.5 3
Although the Court in Carey reaffirmed the right of access to
contraception for unmarried individuals, it deliberately emphasized that
it was not extending the right to privacy to nonmarital sex.'54
147. See Carey, 431 U.S. 678; Eisenstandt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
148. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
149. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 48, at 86.
150. But see Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973) (finding that private,
consensual, adult sexual behavior is fundamental right based on intensely personal and intimate
nature of sexuality itself); Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra note 33, at 1423 (opining that
decisions in privacy cases could not have revolved around marriage or family); Richards, supra note
141, at 981 n.107 (citing Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; and Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) as evidence that right to privacy applies to nonmarital contexts).
The theory that locates the right to privacy in personal autonomy represents an additional
"mainstream" method of establishing a fundamental right to fornication, but is beyond the scope of
this Comment. See Richards, supra note 141; see also David AJ. Richards, UnnaturalActs and the
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1281 (1977). Cf. Survey on
the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521,
564-93 (1986) [hereinafter Survey] (comparing autonomy theory, as applied to sexual privacy, with
family-based right to privacy).
151. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
152. Id.
153. Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rev. 765,772-74 (1973).
154. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (1977); see also id. at 705
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that "[n]either our precedents nor
sound principles of constitutional analysis require state legislation to meet the exacting 'compelling
state interest' standard whenever it implicates sexual freedom").
Fornication Laws
Justice Douglas's insertion of the adjective "marital" when referring
to "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms"' 55 in Griswold was not
inadvertent. Indeed, it was also a bedroom occupied by consenting
unmarried adults to which the Bowers Court refused to extend the right
to privacy.' A lower court observed, "[t]he critical difference between
the bedroom protected in Griswold and the bedroom not protected in
Bowers v. Hardwick is that the former was a marital bedroom and the
latter was not."'57
Nonmarital sex, whether between heterosexuals or homosexuals, does
not "spring from the same deep well of cultural values" or produce the
same effects as do decisions about marriage, procreation, or child
rearing. 5 It is likely, then, that the right to privacy did not protect the
plaintiffs in Bowers because their sexual conduct lacked the imprimatur
of marriage, not solely because their sexual conduct lacked the quality of
heterosexuality.'59 The Court has determined that valuable reasons exist
for the "sacred" status of the marital relationship; 6 thus, it has
maintained the distinction throughout its decisions. 6 '
3. The Right to Spatial Privacy Does Not Encompass Matters of
Sexual Gratification that Occur in the Home
Stanley was grounded primarily in the First Amendment, not the
Fourteenth, and hence has limited relevance in an action for a violation
of one's federal privacy right.'62 Moreover, whatever right to privacy in
the home exists is unlikely to qualify as fundamental.'63 The Court has
emphasized that illegal conduct is not immune merely because it occurs
155. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
156. Schochet v. State, 541 A.2d 183, 188 (Md. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
157. Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
158. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 154, at 774.
159. Schochet, 541 A.2d at 188.
160. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (noting that marriage "promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects" and is
"an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in [the Court's] prior decisions").
161. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (finding no relationship
between homosexuality and privacy right protecting marriage); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(upholding right of married people to use contraception).
162. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (noting that
Stanley was "firmly grounded in the First Amendment").
163. Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 276-78.
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in the home. 6' The Stanley Court also implied that demonstration of
external harm would eliminate the protection extended to the
petitioner.1 6' Given the evident harms of fornication,166 the concept of
spatial privacy cannot protect such conduct.67
C. Fornication Laws are Rationally Related to a Legitimate State End
As previously demonstrated, a fundamental right to fornicate has not
historically been protected and may not be inferred from the various lines
of reasoning about the right to privacy. Consequently, the Court will
uphold the statute as long as a state can show some rational relationship
between its means and ends that may legitimately be served by
exercising its police power.'68 Because the state has several rational bases
for prohibiting fornication-preventing disease and birth out of
wedlock, 169 promoting a certain baseline morality, 7 ' and protecting
164. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11. Activity protected by virtue of being in one's home has
centered on the beliefs, thoughts, and emotions of individuals, not on their actions. Id. at 565-66.
165. See Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 277 (discussing demonstration of external harm as
limit on right to privacy within home); see also Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67 (distinguishing Stanley
from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), in which Court held that obscenity was not within
area of constitutionally protected speech or press, on grounds that dangers of obscene material
failling into hands of children or intruding upon sensibilities or privacy of general public are not
present in Stanley where issue is private possession of obscene material).
166. See infra Part VI (discussing tendency to promote disease and extramarital birth, discredit
public morals, and discourage marriage).
167. But see Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (interpreting Stanley to
extend right to privacy to matters of sexual gratification that occur in home).
168. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17, 40, 51 (1973); see also supra
Part II.B.
169. See infra Part V.A.; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding
presumption that child born to married woman cohabiting with husband is child of marriage rather
than of natural father); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding mandatory
vaccination).
170. See infra Part V.B. The police power of a state embraces "regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31
(1885). The Supreme Court has upheld the right of states to regulate morality and sexual
promiscuity. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 66-69 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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marriage 71-fomication statutes pass the lenient traditional rational basis
test and do not violate substantive due process. 72
V. FORNICATION STATUTES SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY
Even if the Court were to find a fundamental right to engage in sex,
fornication statutes would survive strict scrutiny. States have compelling
reasons to restrict the exercise of the right to marriage. Fornication
statutes are narrowly tailored to accomplish these goals.
A. Preventing Disease and Extramarital Birth
The state's interests in preventing extramarital birth and sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs) are compelling. 73 The more difficult
question is whether fornication statutes are narrowly tailored to achieve
these goals."
Abstinence is a more effective means of achieving the state's goals of
preventing births out of wedlock and STDs than either contraception or
sex education programs. 7 Sex education has little effect on teenagers'
decisions to engage in or postpone sex and does not significantly reduce
teen pregnancy. 76 Contraceptives, even when used properly, tend to be
171. See discussion infra Part V.C.; see also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)
(upholding denial of franchise to those engaged in polygamous marriage and noting legitimacy of
legislation designed to promote traditional notions of marriage).
172. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978)
(noting that statutes not infringing on fundamental rights bear presumption of constitutionality, and
burden is on party complaining of due process violation to establish that "'legislature has acted in an
arbitrary and irrational way") (citation omitted).
173. Siegel, supra note 120, at 87; Survey, supra note 151, at 623-24; Note, supra note 20, at
1668-70; Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 298-301; see also Michael H., 491 U.S. 110
(upholding presumption that child born to married woman cohabiting with husband is child of
marriage rather than of natural father); Jacobsen, 197 U.S. 11 (upholding mandatory vaccination).
174. Siegel, supra note 120, at 87-88; Survey, supra note 151, at 623-35; Note, supra note 20, at
1669-70; Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 298-99,302-04.
175. Given the lack of enforcement of fornication laws, it is difficult to prove that they are a better
deterrent; yet, even if such laws were enforced, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such laws
would be difficult to gather. See infra notes 177-78.
176. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Failure of Sex Education, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1994, at 55,
68; see also Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 302-03 (observing that education may be
ineffective in preventing disease and extramarital births); Douglas Kirby et al., "School-based
Programs to Reduce Sexual Risk Behaviors: A Review of Effectiveness," Public Health Reports,
May/June 1994, at 339, 345, 352-53, 359 (concluding that relationship between sex education
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used irregularly and therefore are unreliable. 77 Hence, fornication laws
are necessary to curb disease and extramarital births.
17 1
Fornication laws may be attacked as overinclusive 79  and
underinclusive;"8 ' but, neither challenge is fatal. States can cure
overinclusiveness problems by redrafting fornication statutes to exclude
monogamous, healthy individuals who are infertile or sterile. With
regard to underinclusiveness, the Supreme Court has recognized that
piecemeal legislation is a pragmatic means of effecting needed reforms
where a demand for comprehensiveness is not feasible at the current
time." ' Finally, states can avoid underinclusiveness problems by
requiring each applicant for a marriage license to submit to a blood test
or sign an affidavit showing that the applicant does not have an STD or
that the condition is known to both applicants.
18 2
programs and initiation of intercourse, use of contraceptives, and pregnancy rates remains unclear,
and that sex education does not represent total solution to problems).
177. Whitehead, supra note 177, at 68. About 95% of U.S. women aged 15-44 who are at risk of
unintended pregnancy use a contraceptive method. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Facts in Brief:
Contraceptive Use (1998). Nonetheless, more than three million unintended pregnancies occur
annually in the United States. Id. Thirty percent of all births now occur outside of marriage. June
Carbone, Symposium, Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the
Public/Private Divide, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 267, 268 (1996).
Twelve million Americans contract an STD every year. Medical Inst. for Sexual Health, "Condom
Sense: " Is it Enough? (n.d.). Even when condoms are used in every sexual encounter, which is rare,
studies suggest that the risk of transmitting HIN cannot be entirely eliminated. Id.; see also John E.
Anderson et al., Condom Use for Disease Prevention Among Unmarried U.S. Women, Family
Planning Perspectives, vol. 28, no. 1, Jan/Feb. 1996 (documenting frequency of condom use).
178. Fornication laws may be insufficient to curb disease and extramarital births resulting from
nonmarital sex, but they are a necessary supplement to education and contraception. See Whitehead,
supra note 177, at 69 (noting that sex education works best when it combines clear messages about
behavior with strong moral and logistical support for behavior sought).
179. Fornication statutes fail to distinguish between healthy and infected persons, and between
sexually promiscuous individuals and monogamous unmarried couples; therefore, they may be an
overinclusive way to prevent disease. Since numerous individuals have been sterilized or are
infertile, fornication statutes may be an overinclusive method of preventing births out of wedlock.
See supra note 175.
180. Fornication statutes may be an underinclusive means of preventing disease since they do not
prohibit repeated marriages and thereby allow transmission of sexual infections between spouses.
See supra note 175.
181. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,487-89 (1955).
182. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 30-117 (Supp. 1997) (requiring blood test for syphilis); Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.04.210 (1996) (requiring marriage applicants to sign affidavit).
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B. Prohibiting Immoral Conduct
Caselaw suggests that the state's interest in proscribing conduct in
order to uphold traditional and deeply rooted moral values may be
compelling. '83 A danger arguably exists that deeming morality a
compelling interest will allow states to justify limitless infringements on
fundamental rights by making "unprovable assumptions about what is
good for the people."'' But, the Court precludes such Orwellian
scenarios by demanding that the moral purpose be embedded in the
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices to be compelling, and by
requiring lawmakers to abide by the laws they pass.'85 Moral goals are
only compelling, for purposes of constitutional analysis, when they are
"deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition."'1 6 Values like
chastity and sexual abstinence outside of marriage are so basic to the
traditions and institutions of our society'87 and so tightly defined, that
they are compelling. The Equal Protection Clause also requires the
democratic majority to abide by the laws they impose on the public,'88
further minimizing the potential that the state's "moral power" will lead
to tyranny.
Fornication laws are a dramatic symbol of moral disapprobation and
essential to achieving the state's goal of promoting morality. An
alternative such as a statewide campaign promoting premarital
abstinence may be a less restrictive means of promoting sexual morality;
however, its effectiveness would be limited if the discouraged conduct
were legal.'89 Fornication laws prohibit only that act that the state
183. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (stating that law is "constantly based on
notions of morality" and upholding morality as rational basis for legislation). The Supreme Court has
found no difficulty in upholding state laws legislating morality under the police power. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (holding that public indecency statute furthers
substantial government interest in protecting morality); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
62 (1973) (recognizing state's right to make "unprovable assumptions about what is good for the
people").
184. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 62.
185. Concededly, tradition-based tests have inherent difficulties. See supra note 27.
186. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977).
187. See supra Part I.
188. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, .,
concurring).
189. The national "Just Say No (to Drugs)" campaign had the backing of legal prohibitions (and
even so its effectiveness is unclear). See also infra Part VI.
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considers to be the substantive problem."9 These laws also have the
unique ability to signal appropriate behavior and help reconstruct
norms.191 Consequently, fornication statutes are narrowly tailored to
promote the state's compelling interest in promoting moral sexual
conduct.
C. Encouraging and Maintaining the Integrity ofMarriage
One of the most threatening aspects of fornication is its potential to
become an alternative to marriage, monogamy, and the family
relationship, thereby undermining the valued institution of marriage. 92
As nonmarital sex becomes more socially acceptable, individuals wait
longer to get married or do not marry at all. 93 The state has a compelling
interest in ensuring that the continuing allegiance to marriage and
traditional family commitments does not decline. 94
Marriage is the basis of stable expectations in personal 'relationships,
and carries with it a commitment to permanence.19 The Court has long
described marriage as "the most important relation in life"1 96 and the
"foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress."'97 Justice Harlan wrote in Poe v.
Ullman:
190. Survey, supra note 151, at 622-23.
191. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2032-33
(1996) (discussing ability of law to reconstruct norms).
192. The Court has recognized marriage as a fundamental right Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978). Cf. I Harvie Wilkonson & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal
Litfestyles, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 563, 595 (1977) (referring to danger of homosexuality becoming
alternative to heterosexuality and institutions associated with it).
193. The number of unmarried adults has doubled since 1970, and the proportion of unmarried
adults has risen from 28% to 39%. Arlene F. Sauter, Marital Status and Living Arrangements, Mar.
1994, at vi-vii (Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce). The estimated median age at first
marriage in 1994 was 26.7 for men and 24.5 for women. Id. In 1956, the median age reached a low
of 22.5 for men and 20.1 for women. Most of the increase occurring since 1956 has occurred since
1975. Id.
194. Distinguished sociologist Alice Rossie agrees that "the machine cultures of the West have
[no] social institutions capable of providing individual loyalty and social integration to replace the
bonds of the family." Karl Zinsmeister, Marriage as the Male Antidote, Am. Enter., May/June 1996,
at 46,46 (quoting Alice Rossie); see also id. (quoting George Gilder).
195. Hafen, supra note 114, at 486.
196. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,205 (1888).
197. Id. at 211.
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The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual
powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which
children are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding
adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express the
negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage,
form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life
that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis. 9 '
Men, women, and society benefit from mariage.'" Nomnarital
relationships perform some intimate and associational functions, but lack
marriage's effectiveness in promoting a political structure that "limits
government, stabilizes social patterns, and protects pluralistic liberty
through the power of its own relational permanency. '2°' Even cohabitants
in lengthy "marriage-like" relationships fare significantly worse than
married couples.01
Requiring people to postpone sexual gratification until they are
married is not an excessively burdensome means of promoting marriage,
particularly in light of the additional goals fornication statutes achieve.
Laws extensively regulate other, equally significant aspects of family
life.2 2 Statutes mandating that individuals defer enjoyment of sex until
marriage are no different from regulations on abortion and marriage.
198. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
199. Married couples show lower levels of alcohol and cigarette consumption, higher earnings,
and longer life spans. Lee A. Lillard & Linda J. Waite, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Marital Disruption
and Mortality, Am. J. Soc., Mar. 1995, at 1131, 1131. Marriage also gives a sense of obligation to
others, discouraging high-risk behaviors and encouraging financial earnings and savings. William R.
Mattox, Jr., Marital Bliss, Am. Enter., May/June 1996, at 45, 45; see also Zinsmeister, supra note
195, at 46. Children tend to suffer when they are born and raised out of wedlock or by a single
parent. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, Atlantic Monthly, Apr. 1993, at 47, 47;
see also Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). Crime and
unemployment rates are much higher among unmarried men. Zinsmeister, supra note 195, at 46.
200. Hafen, supra note 114, at 482.
201. Mattox, supra note 200, at 45 (describing higher rates of depression and domestic violence
among cohabiting women); see also William R. Mattox, Jr., Be My POSSLQ? Is Living Together as
Good as Marriage?, Ideas & Energy, at 2, 2 (Family Research Council, 1998) (noting higher divorce
rates for people who cohabit before marriage).
202. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.88.030 (1996) (making prostitution misdemeanor); Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.04.020 (1996) (outlawing bigamy and marriages between kin); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.04.210 (1996) (imposing minimum age requirements for marriage); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding informed consent requirements, 24-hour waiting period and
parental consent provisions even though such requirements may make it virtually impossible for
some women to obtain abortions); Id. at 937 (Blackmun, I., concurring in part, and dissenting in
part); Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding age restrictions on fundamental right
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The possibility that some individuals may spend their entire lives
without a spouse, never enjoying their "fundamental right" to have sex,
does not diminish the validity of fornication statutes. Government has
not denied individuals the right to engage in sex any more than it has
denied the right of marriage to individuals who find a desired mate at age
fifteen, but find nobody after they reach eighteen, or denied the right to
abort to a woman who cannot wait twenty-four hours to have an abortion
after receiving information about alternatives.0 3 The state has merely
imposed reasonable regulations on the exercise of the right in order to
further a compelling state interest. Nothing suggests the right to engage
in sex is somehow more fundamental than the rights to marry2" and
pursue one's calling;2 5 yet, numerous statutes limit individuals in
achieving these goals.2' The Court has failed to find anything
disconcerting about denying individuals the right to engage in sexual
activity unless they adhere to certain conditions. 7
Although community and family dissuasion and moral teaching may
be a less coercive means of encouraging marriage, the state lacks a
method of ensuring that such attitudes are perpetuated. Staging massive
public awareness campaigns or sponsoring events to assist singles in
meeting lifetime spouses would be less restrictive means of promoting
marriage, but also less effective. Tax incentives may promote marriage
without burdening sexual intimacy; however, sex, for most, is a bigger
"carrot" and more easily perceived as a benefit of marriage than a tax
incentive." Furthermore, the Supreme Court does not usually require the
to marry); Roe II v. Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. 1569 (S.D. Fla.) (upholding constitutionality of
statutes prohibiting prostitution), a.f'd, 129 F.3d 1221 (lth Cir. 1997); H.B. 1130, 55th Leg., 1998
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998) (defining marriage as union of man and woman).
203. Age restrictions on marriage and waiting periods for abortion delay, rather than forbid,
exercise of a right. However, such delays can have the same effect as an outright prohibition. See
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 937 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 384 (1978).
205. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment
"liberty" includes right to engage in any occupation).
206. See supra note 203; see also Wash. Rev. Code § 2A8.060 (1996) (requirements for
becoming attorney); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28A.410.020-.025 (1996) (requirements for becoming
schoolteacher).
207. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (upholding statutes prohibiting sodomy
between homosexuals and thereby potentially withholding any opportunity homosexuals may have
to engage in sex); see also Roe 11, 958 F. Supp. 1569 (upholding constitutionality of prohibiting
prostitution).
208. Some people are outside the tax system and would not benefit from a tax incentive for
marriage. Additionally, states may not have sufficient financial means to permit tax incentives.
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state to show that its alternative is the least restrictive when the state's
asserted interest closely fits the means the state uses to achieve that
interest.2
9
Fornication statutes further the state's compelling interests in
preventing disease and extramarital birth, and promoting the institution
of marriage. The statutes are narrowly tailored to achieve these interests.
They do not deprive an individual of a right to engage in sex, but merely
channel its exercise into the marital relationship. Consequently,
fornication statutes should withstand strict scrutiny.
VI. UNENFORCED FORNICATION STATUTES ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND SERVE A VALUABLE PURPOSE
The threat of prosecution is not sufficient to present a case or
controversy;210 hence, as long as fornication statutes are not enforced,
they cannot be challenged. Nonenforcement of fornication statutes may
be desirable, even if the laws are constitutional, because enforcement has
potentially undesirable ramifications.2 '
What good is a statute prohibiting fornication if it is not enforced?
Fornication laws need not control behavior directly to serve the
important functions of reinforcing social norms and publicly condemning
immorality. 2 2 Unenforced laws regularly, and often profoundly, affect
societal notions regarding morally acceptable activity.2
13
209. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
210. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (holding that plaintiff had no justiciable controversy
given lack of showing that statutes prohibiting distribution of contraceptives would be enforced
against them); see also Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding theoretical threat of
prosecution under state fornication statute insufficient to present case or controversy).
211. For example, extramarital births would constitute prima facie evidence of fornication,
creating an incentive for abortions, particularly black-market abortions, and causing unmarried
women to avoid prenatal care and treatment of sexually transmitted disease. Even minor penalties,
like parenting classes or small fines, carry such potential. Fornication statutes also permit
discriminatory arrests and prosecutions. See, e.g., Model Penal Code, supra note 112, at 435; Posner,
supra note 129, at 207.
212. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 2024-25; see also id. at 2032 (citing laws forbidding littering
and requiring people to clean up after their dogs as examples). State prohibitions on polygamy and
sodomy, while not avidly enforced, have also influenced social norms, driving such conduct
underground, even if the conduct still occurs.
213. Id at 2032-33, 2051. Cf. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421,423 (Ill. 1979) (divesting mother
of custody by deeming her unfit role model to her children because she violated fornication statute);
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to punish landlord under marital status
discrimination statute for not renting to unmarried couple because couple intended to violate
criminal fornication statute).
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Decriminalization of fornication means, literally, the removal of
disapproval; the state's posture becomes one of neutrality, if not
approval.214 This could make fornication appear more acceptable,
particularly to young people with unformed morals."' In short,
fornication laws, even if unenforced, are intrinsically valuable for their
educative and rhetorical effect, and can potentially serve as a strong
barrier to action.'16
Not everything one can describe as a 'wrong' should come within the
reach of the law.2 17 However, the state has few reasons not to interfere,
and several compelling reasons to interfere, with an individual's
engagement in the immoral act of fornication. Unenforced fornication
laws neither prevent the individual from fulfilling essential obligations
nor put the individual at risk of serious harm. Such laws are unlikely to
damage the common good in any way, jeopardize important liberties, or
encourage undue conformism and mindless obedience to authority."' If
fornication laws are widely flouted and considered illegitimate by many,
disrespect for the law prohibiting fornication may breed disrespect for
the law in general. This need not be the case. The law against perjury, for
example, is difficult to enforce and frequently violated; yet, rarely do
people brag about having committed perjury. Similarly, fornication laws,
particularly if publicized,2"9 may help minimize the reputational benefits
214. Wilkonson & White, supra note 193, at 595.
215. Id.
216. Mueller, supra note 1, at 18 (observing that even disrespected and disregarded sex laws may
impact behavior, but conceding that extent to which they impact behavior is difficult to verify); see
also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 529-39 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that threat of
prosecution, however slight, deters appellants from engaging in conduct in which they assert right to
engage).
217. See Robert P. George, Making Men Moral 118 (1993). Given the existence of disagreement
and the potential to impose on individuals burdens they simply should not bear, toleration of
immoral conduct may at times be the better public policy. This is not to say that there is a moral right
to perform immoral actions, but rather that "[o]pportunities for immoral choice inhere in the human
condition." Id. at 128; see also Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution 38 (1990) (observing that
prudence may cause one to hesitate before bringing every "wrong" within reach of law). Thus,
legislators should always identify various prudential considerations for not outlawing certain forms
of immorality, such as fornication. See George, supra, at 117 (discussing need to evaluate prudential
considerations when contemplating enactment of moral laws in general).
218. See George, supra note 218, at 117 (listing prudential reasons why one might not interfere
with performance of immoral act).
219. The effect of current fornication statutes has been significantly diminished by the fact that
many people do not even know such laws exist Note, Fornication, supra note 105, at 305; see also
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72
Vol. 73:767, 1998
Fornication Laws
of engaging in nonmarital sexual activity and ultimately discourage the
behavior.
VII. CONCLUSION
Neither history and tradition nor the various forms of reasoning in the
Court's privacy jurisprudence support a fundamental right to engage in
fornication; thus, the state need only assert a rational basis for its
fornication statute to withstand a substantive due process challenge.
Courts should uphold fornication statutes because states have many
plausible reasons for prohibiting fornication.
Even if the Court were to find a fundamental right to engage in
extramarital sexual activity, fornication statutes withstand strict scrutiny.
The state's interests in preventing disease and extramarital births,
protecting the institution of marriage, and promoting morality are
compelling, and fornication statutes are narrowly tailored to achieve
these goals.
Although fornication laws do not violate substantive due process,
states should publicize, but not enforce them. By doing so, states benefit
from the law's rhetorical effect, but avoid the dangers that may result
from enforcement. Keeping fornication statutes on the books and
informing the public of their existence might not prevent fornication, but
it will send a much needed message of social disapproval, driving this
immoral conduct underground.
Laws alone, no matter how wise or how moral, cannot make people
moral and are not sufficient to establish and maintain a healthy moral
society." ° People only become moral by choosing to do the morally right
thing for the morally right reasons." Therefore, law cannot and should
not usurp the function of the valuable mediating institutions that are
essential to maintain a decent moral atmosphere. Laws, however, like
those prohibiting fornication, can powerfully reinforce, if not shape, the
teachings of parents, families, teachers, religious communities and other
persons and institutions who have the primary role in forming moral
individuals.m
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967, 980-81 (1997) (noting that laws are unlikely to change culture without public
awareness).
220. George, supra note 218, at 1.
221. Id.
222. Id. at46.
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